Seeing, Feeling, and Mediated Empathy

A course journal on seeing, feeling, and mediated empathy.

Morandi Siyuan Wu

CRIT 415

2025

In this week's journal I'll focus on the discussion of seeing and feeling. Because in a world where image technology and virtual reality are becoming more and more precise and intimate, it's hard to really empathize with another person's lived experience through a screen. While reading the articles, I was reminded of a video by Chris Milk that I watched in another class called race, gender and class. He once called VR “the ultimate empathy machine”, and in his project “Clouds Over Sidra”, people can “experience” the daily life of a little refugee girl from a first-hand perspective. In class discussions, however, we felt that this kind of viewing was not truly immersive, but rather a form of visual manipulation. The girl was chosen because she is “harmless,” “innocent,” and “visually accessible,” and her experience is reduced to a symbol that can be forwarded and moved, rather than a concrete, complex, individual. As Harbison said, although images float in the global network, the underlying structure is still a distribution of power in terms of “who can be viewed and who must be hidden”. Sidra's images are not only “objects to be viewed”, but also a kind of “visual symbols” that have been compressed. So in fact, this visual symbolization is a strategy of over-refinement. Her complexity is reduced to a predictable story for ease of communication and acceptance: she is a refugee, but she is a gentle, quiet, and not angry regugee. The symbol strips away specifics and contradictions, making the audience a very smooth viewing, but also depriving empathy of the possibility of truly reaching the pain points. Instead of feeling Sidra's situation, we are interacting with a “convenient character”. Other sufferings that do not lend themselves to visualization, to international narratives, are more likely to be algorithmically forgotten.

Therefore I realized that these carefully composed, technologically embellished images, even with the “free view” claimed by panoramic VR, are still essentially a limited way of seeing. The path of viewing is still designed, and our feelings are directed towards specific emotions.

I also thought of the window and frame theory I learned earlier. Traditional media often invite us to view the other through the structure of a window, such as the frame in photography or the long shot in documentaries, which tries to convey the illusion of a “complete world”. But the frames in digital media are fluid. We click to determine the viewing area and the rhythm of viewing. This viewing is no longer “I am invited into the world of an other people”, but “I consume an image of the others from options I have”. And the result is, the more we see, the less we feel. Kapadia points out in On the Skin that contemporary images of war are becoming increasingly divorced from the body and from perception. Victims no longer appear as wounds, eyes, or pain, but are treated with certain terms. We can see those red dots in the thermal image, but we can not see the body, the family, the crying behind that red dot. Under such a viewing structure, the viewer is systematically trained to be a non-empathic character. Because they only need to react, not to be emotionally disturbed.

In contrast, Notes on Blindness, a VR work I've played before, resonated with me in a very different way. Instead of reproducing blindness visually, the work constructs the experience of invisibility through sound, vibration, and blurred space. As a viewer I could not grasp the stable world and had to rely on my other senses. At this point I felt that I was not looking at someone but feeling like someone. I remember the illusion of sound particles floating in the darkness, the low-frequency vibrations that made me realize that certain experiences cannot be reduced by images, and that we have to give up the hegemony of the visual in order to get really close to the other. I associate this “anti-image” approach with Amelia Jones' analysis of Carolee Schneemann's Plumb Line. In this work, Schneemann rubs her body against the medium, and the image becomes ruptured and disorganized, no longer a means of conveying emotion but an explosion of emotion itself. I particularly like Jones’ quote: “In works such as these, Schneemann performs not her body as object but embodiment as process.” This made me realize that the real body politic is not “whether I present myself to others”, but “whether I am able to make the very act of looking unstable and uncertain”. Schneemann is not telling a complete story about the “self,” but rather using the incoherence, rupture, and loss of control of the image to disrupt our inertial understanding of viewing. She opens a crack inside the image system and makes me realize that the image is not always stable, clear, or controllable; it is equally fragile, painful, and even collapsing. It is this instability that makes us begin to question the power structures of viewing and rethink possible ways of perception and empathy.

In this sense, I'd like to echo an important concept mentioned by both Harbison and Jones: viewing as labor. We are not observers standing outside of the view, but rather participants in its constant “labor”. In contemporary prosumer culture, every click, retweet, and even emotional investment we make is part of the image system. We think we're just watching, but we're actually reproducing the illusionary mechanism. I really like the idea of the televisual body that Jones puts forward, and although I don't think I have a particularly comprehensive understanding of it, my feeling at the moment is that it challenges the notion of viewing as a cold, abstract object, and instead creates a “new kind of presence” instead of the traditional idea. We do not only look at the image with our eyes, but “feel” its presence with our whole body (haptic viewing). Then the problem we face is no longer just about whether the image itself is real or not, but we need to realize that our viewing itself has become a part of “reality”. In the system of the right to see, our act of “seeing” may not be a search for truth, but rather an act of being pulled to believe in an image-constructed truth.

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