Spectatorship and Responsibility

A course journal on spectatorship and responsibility.

Morandi Siyuan Wu

CRIT 415

2025

Since my journal last week focused on Doyle's article and discussion of the emotional difficulty of viewing, this week's journal I'll be focusing on Taylor's Spect Actor article.

One of the ideas about viewing and spectatorship that I strongly believed in before reading this post came from a previous study of Barthes' The Author is Dead. In my perception, the meaning of any work is open to the viewer's interpretation as the completion of the work. This viewing identity is neutral. But the question arises, if all interpretations are open, are all viewers' understandings “correct” in their perspective? And in terms of audience participation, I am reminded that in immersive experiences and interactive art, the audience seems to be given the initiative, but in reality, their identities, perspectives, and scope of behavior are often framed by a certain set of rules, and the audience can't really break the system, but can only act within the “free” scope provided by the curators. For example, in the immersive theater Sleep No More that I participated in Shanghai, the audience was able to move freely in different rooms, watch clips of different characters, and interact with the characters to unlock the plot. The audience has a certain degree of autonomy in choosing the route they take and the story they receive. However, the story line and the ending are fixed in a certain sense, and no matter how the viewer tries, the final outcome is within the arranged possibilities. The viewer's “freedom” is actually a kind of freedom that has been set. So is this really “breaking the relationship between the viewer and the performer”? Or is it just setting up a new framework that gives the audience the false impression that they have more power?

But reading Michel Melamed's example of electroshock performance in the article changed my mind a bit. If immersive and interactive art experiences in general remain within the rules, in extreme cases viewing can cease to be comfortable and the viewer is morally compelled to realize that he or she is involved and can no longer be just a spectator.

In Michel Melamed's electroshock performance the audience initially watches with curiosity, but they soon realize that every time they make a sound, Melamed's body receives an electric shock. Their identity changes immediately: they are no longer passive spectators, but moral interveners or perpetrators. They are forced to choose between “silence” and “active harm,” and even if they do nothing, they have become part of the performance. The horror of this viewing experience is that it creates a moral dilemma and makes the viewer realize that they cannot stand aside from it. They thought they were “innocent”, but in fact, their silence was a choice, even a complicity. This reminds me of the memorial ceremony at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall (I'm from Nanjing, and this is a very painful part of the city's history). Watching the exhibition may bring great emotional impact, but in my observation only when we reach the final part of the actual action of placing flowers and writing tributes, many viewers really realize that they are the bearers of historical memories, not just a passive visitor. This action makes them realize, “I can't just come and look, but I need to respond to this history in some way.” I think this suggests that the extreme viewing experience is not just an input of information, but an emotionally compelling intervention. Viewing is not just a personal experience, but part of the social fabric. It makes the viewer realize that their very act of viewing is already part of the action, not an optional choice. In Doyle's article last week he argued that the emotional difficulty of viewing is itself a form of engagement, but I think Taylor goes further and emphasizes the inadequacy of viewing itself, that it requires some form of action to truly complete the meaning of viewing.

Taylor mentions Percepticide in his article, which refers to a totalitarian environment where people are forced to train themselves to “not see” what they shouldn't see in order to ensure their own safety. This reminds me once again of the contemporary social scene: how algorithms shape the “invisible”. In North Korea's political propaganda, official media control people to see only certain images, shaping the collective consciousness. In my online world, the “information cocoon” of algorithms allows social media to push only the content that users like, gradually blinding people to what they don't want to see. It's hard to see the difficulties experienced by female factory workers and grassroots laborers, for example, whose existence is often ignored by the mainstream media, consciously or unconsciously. But it is possible to see a lot of capital-controlled commodities and the propaganda of the Netflix economy. In the digital age, do we still have the ability to choose what we watch, or has viewing itself been manipulated by algorithms? When we “watch”, are we actively accessing information, or are we being pushed? And how do we break this down. I think Taylor's article gives me some good answers.

ALL WRITING
↗